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(Concluded from June .o. Ante, p.373.)
(Power of Inferior Courts.)
THE power of all inferior courts is limited to direct contempts
committed in the presence of the court. This is especially so as to
such courts as the recently created county courts in England, whose
powers are limited by the statutes creating them: 4 Stephens's
Com. 342, note g; _ex v. Faulkner, 2 Mon. & Ayrton's Cases in
Bankruptcy 332, 339. An inferior court, even of record, cannot
punish contempt committed out of court: Beg. v. Lefroy, L. R., 8
Q. B. 134; 4 Moak 250. For contempt to inferior jurisdictions, not
of record nor having a general power to fine and imprison, unless
committed in the presence of the officer and punished instanter,
there is no other remedy than by indictment. Bac. Abr., Courts,
E., and cases cited: Hfollingsworth v. Duane, Wallace 77, 92;
Lining v. Bentham, 2 Bay 1; State v. Johnson, Id. 385; State
v. Applegate, 2 McCord 110. The Commissioners of Sewers,
though a court of record, can imprison only for contempt committed in their presence, not for disobedience of their orders:
Siderfin 145, A. D. 1663.
As has been mentioned, in speaking of the superior courts, the
jurisdiction of inferior courts has no presumption of law in its
favor. "Nothing shall be intended to be within the jurisdiction
Of
of an inferior court but what is expressly alleged to be so."
Peacock
:"
notice
"judicial
their jurisdiction courts do not take
v. Bell, 1 Saund. 74. But if they have jurisdiction, everything
(425)
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shall be intended in favor of their judgment: Brown v. Gill, 2
M., Gr. & Scott 860.
(Subject to the supervision of the higher courts.)

A logical result of this principle is, that the power of inferior

courts over contempts is subject to examination and control by the
higher courts.
The jurisdiction of an inferior court or magistrate must appear
on the face of the proceedings, and the warrant or order of commitment must set forth the facts and circumstances of the contempt,
so that it may appear affirmatively that the court had jurisdiction,
both of the subject-matter and of the offender, and its proceedings
must appear to be lawful and regular. This is necessary that the
superior court may be fully advised of the rightfulness of the commitment, as otherwise the inferior court could deprive the superior
court of its right of review.
As a general rule these principles apply also to courts of limited
and special jurisdiction: Reg. v. Paty, 2 Ld. Raym. 1106; Bac.
Abr., Courts, D. 2, and D. 4; Vin. Abr., Contempt, 0 3; 9 Madd.
95; Hurd on Hab. Cor. 415 n; Kempe v. Kennedy, 5 Cr. 173;
-Ex parte Watkins, 3 Pet. 205; -Ex parte Fernandez, 10 C. B.
N. S. 36; Matter of -Dimes, 14 Q. B. 555; Beaubien v. Brinckerhoff, 2 Scam. 274, and note adfin.
To an inferior court "credit is not to be given for conforming
itself to the appointed limits of its jurisdiction," and its proceedings
must be " holden by averments to show that they were beyond
all question authorized and regular :" E-x parte Fernandez, supra
40.
The jurisdiction of a justice of the peace is limited and contrary to common law, and, therefore, it is necessary to see on the
face of his proceedings that he has gone beyond his jurisdiction.
ALDERSON, Baron, in Gosset v. Howard, 10 Q. B. 440; Reg. v.
Vickery, 12 Id. 477. His commitment must be in writing; Mayhew v. Locke, 2 Marsh. 377; s. c., 7 Taunt. 63. And if a man
be committed for contempt by an inferior court or magistrate, and
the commitment does not set forth the particular nature of the contempt, the Court of King's Bench, on habeas corpus, will bail the
party committed: 2 Hawk. 168, sect. 77. A certiorari lies to all
inferior jurisdictions to have their proceedings removed into the
King's Bench, to see that they keep themselves within their jurisdiction: 2 Hawk. 399; Groenwelt v. Burwell, Salk. 145; Bez
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v. Clement, 4 B. & Ald. 218; -Ex parte Fernandez, 10 C. B. (N.
S.) 36, 40; Hummel and Bishoj's Case, 9 Watts 421.
If an inferior court have no jurisdiction, or exceeds its jurisdiction, its proceedings are coram non judice and void, and its judgments mere nullities: 3 Term Rep. 185; 8 Id. 181, 182 ; Beaubien
v. Brinckerhoff, 2 Scam. 274, and authorities cited in note;
Thompson v. Lyle, 3 W. & S. 166; McCormick v. Sullivant, 10
Wheat. 192; Wilcox v. Jackson, 13 Pet. 498.
We have now to see to what extent the proceedings of inferior
courts in matters of contempt will be examined and revised by
higher courts.
It is a universal rule that the reviewing court will examine and
determine: 1st. If the court below had jurisdiction. 2d. If its proceedings were regular and lawful.
Beyond the limits of this principle there is a great dissimilarity
of opinion and practice.
As authorities to sustain this universal rule, decisions which
extend this power of review of proceedings for contempt, in these
two particulars, to the proceedings in superior courts are, afortiori,
in point here, free, of course, of the limitations and qualifications
which they attach to the power of review, which may, or may not,
apply in case of inferior courts.
Such are the decisions in Hummel and Bishoff's Case, 9 Watts
421 ; Commonwealth v. Newton, 1 Grant 453; In re Cooper, 32
Vt. 253; -Ex parte Mitchell, 12 Abb. Pr. 249; People v. Kelly,
24 N. Y. 74; In re Stokes, 5 S. C. 71; -Exparte Burr, 9 Wheat.
529; Romeyn v. Caplis, 17 Mich. 449; Bickley v. Commonwealth,
2 J. J. Marsh. 572; Bex v. Clement, 4 B. & Ald. 218; Middlebrook v. State, 43 Conn. 257; -Ex parte Fernandez, 10 C. B.
(N. S.) 3; Sparks v. Martyn, Ventris 1; Oarus Wilson's Case,
7 Q. B. 1015.
We come now to cases in accord with those just cited, in which
proceedings in an inferior court have been examined in a higher.
Taking first, the English cases, we find it laid down by COCKBURN,
C. J., in Be Pater,5 B. & S. 299, which was a rule, &c., for a
certiorari from the Queen's Bench, to the justices of the Quarter
Sessions, to bring up certain orders made by them, that in case of
punishment for contempt by a court of inferior jurisdiction, the
Court of Queen's Bench has authority to interfere and prevent
any usurpation of jurisdiction, and if there is no reasonable ground
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for treating as contempt that which the inferior court has considered
as such, the Court of Queen's Bench may interfere to protect the
party upon whom the power to commit for contempt has been improperly exercised. "We are to see whether there is evidence
upon which the Court of Quarter Sessions could reasonably come
to the conclusion that a contempt had been committed; we are not
to try the effect of the evidence and determine whether their decision was right or wrong." "All we have to see is whether the
Quarter Sessions had jurisdiction in the matter complained of."
It was, moreover, said by BLACKBURN, J., that "it is very important
to bear in mind the distinction between a cqurt of appeal and a
court of supervision over inferior tribunals," citing Lord DENAIAN
in Carus Wilson's Case. The Queen's Bench is not in such case
a court of appeal. See also Ex yarte JFernandez,10 C. B. (N. S.)
25; Ventris 336.
A fine for contempt by an inferior court, and the cause of imposing it will be considered and determined by the Court of Exchequer, the fine being returned into the exchequer on a mandate
from the Chief Baron: Rex v. Sherff of Middlesex, Sir T. Jones
169.
In Reg. v. Lefroy, Law Rep., 8 Q. B. 134; 4 Moak 450, a writ
of prohibition to the judge of a county court restraining him from
proceeding for contempt, was awarded on the ground of want of
jurisdiction. Though a court of record, it was an inferior court
created by statute. As to examinations on habeas corpus, of commitments by inferior courts, see cases cited by KENT, C. J., in
Yates's Case, 4 Johns. 358.
A judge of the highest court of South Carolina on habeas corpus
for one committed by a justice of the peace, discharged the relator
on the ground that the commitment was unauthorized by express law
of the state, and there was no precedent to support it. On error
to the court in banc, judgment affirmed: State v. Applegate, 2
\fcCord 110 (1822).
On habeas corpus in the Supreme Court of New Hampshire
(State v. Towle, 42 N. H. 540, 1861), for one committed for nonpayment of a fine for contempt by a justice of the peace, held, that
the court, on habeas corpus, would examine into the jurisdiction of
the court which sentenced; if it had no jurisdiction, its judgment
would be void, and the prisoner would be discharged. If it had
jurisdiction, its judgment could not be collaterally examined on

CONTEMPT OF COURT.

429

nabeas corpus, but would be final and conclusive till reversed by
appeal, writ of error, certiorari, or other proceeding in some higher
court. It was doubted whether there was any mode of revising
such judgment. The court did not distinguish the case before them
from those of contempt to a superior court, citing Crosby's Case
and others. In a similar case in Wisconsin, the Supreme Court
said: "Here we can, only inquire if the commissioner had jurisdiction to make the order :" In re Perry, 30 Wis. 268.
In cases of contempt, "the rule is well settled" that "unless
the proceedings leading thereto are so grossly defective as to render
them void, the judgment of commitment cannot, in the absence of
tribunal," certainly not on habeas
statute, be reviewed in another
29 Iowa 830.
McDonald,
v.
corpus: Robb
A principle adopted in many cases is that proceedings in matters
of contempt are not reviewed upon their merits.
The reviewing court will not examine into the facts of the case
and re-try the question of contempt or no contempt, if by any fair
intendment the facts or the words used could constitute contempt.
This is a matter for the decision of the court which punishes, provided that they had jurisdiction, and in such case the examining
court will not control their discretion and re-open a matter already
decided by a court of competent jurisdiction.
This principle is stated in terms comprehensive of all courts in
various cases cited before, where proceedings in superior courts were
brought under examination in another court. Such are In re
Crawford, 13 Ad. & E. (N. S.) 613; In re McAleece, 7 Irish
C. L. 152; Carus Wilson's Case, 7 Q. B. 1015; Hummel 4
Bishoff's Case, 9 Watts 421; In re Cooper, 32 Vt. 253;
Bickley v. Commonwealth, 2 J. J. Marsh. 575.
And it has been held to be in force as regards inferior courts in
cases where their proceedings were reviewed (In re Pater,5 B. &
S. 299), even as regards justices of the peace : Clark v. People,
Breese 266.
In contradistinction of this principle on the other hand, several
cases have been cited above, where proceedings for contempt in superior courts were reviewed on their merits, the examining court entering fully into the facts of the case; such are Whittem v. State, 36
Ind. 196 ; Stuart v. Commonwealth, 3 Scam. 395; Ex parte Biqgs,
64 N. 0. 202; Re Pryor, 18 Kan. 72; and where even the discretion of the committing court was criticised, as in Cabot v. Yar-
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borough, 27 Ga. 476; Dobbs v. State, 55 Id. 272; in these states
it is to be presumed that the same action would be taken in regard
to proceedings of inferior courts.
In People v. Justices, ft., 1 Johns. Cas. 181 (1799), the Supreme Court of New York considered the case cS an attorney
stricken off its rolls by the Court of Common Pleas of Delaware
County, and after hearing affidavits, &c., decided that the grounds
of removal were insufficient, and awarded a mandamus to the lower
court to restore the attorney. It was held that the Common Pleas
was an inferior court. It is to be noted that by Act of Legislature
one removed from office as an attorney of the Common Pleas could
not practice in the Supreme Court, and had the Supreme Court no
power to revise the proceedings in the Common Pleas, their control
over their own officers would have been interfered with.
And it seems that in South Carolina in a collateral proceeding,
a suit for damages, evidence will not be received to contradict the
commitment of the magistrate as to the facts of the contempt; certainly not that of one connected in the matter with the offender:
Lining v. Bentham, 2 Bay 1 (1796).
But in the State v. Johnson, Id. 385, which was an indictment
for oppression by a justice of the peace in committing for a contempt before him, the Court of Errors, on motion for a new trial
on conviction, considered the facts of the case fully, and decided
that they fully justified the commitment.
In contradiction of Lining v. Bentham, it has been held in
Michigan (In re HAforton, 10 Mich. 208), where a habeas corpus
was brought in the Supreme Court for one committed by a justice
of the peace in not answering as a witness before him, that the
court would go behind the commitment to receive evidence to show
want of jurisdiction of the proceeding by the justice.
In Stokeley v. (ommonwealth, 1 Va. Cas. 330 (1812), the General Court of Virginia, in the case of one fined for contempt by a
county court, from which a writ of error to the Superior Court had
been taken, and the case adjourned thence to the General Court,
held that the Superior Court had jurisdiction of the case, the fine
being imposed by an inferior court, and that from the facts stated
in the record, the accused was not guilty of contempt to the county
court. On habeas corpus in the Supreme Court of New York for
one committed by the Surrogate's Court, the Supreme Court held
that "the acts set forth in the commitment do not amount to a
criminal contempt :" Matter of Watson, 3 Lansing 408 (1870).
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From an order of court refusing to punish for a contempt, it was
doubted in First Church v. Muscatine, 2 Clarke (Iowa) 69, whether
any appeal lay.
But in Ex parte Chamberlain,4 Cowen 49, it was held that the
exclusive power of courts over their own contempts was subject to
an exception where the civil rights of a person are involved, and
the object of the proceeding is to secure them. In such cases the
Supreme or Appellate Court will compel the lower one by mandamus to issue an attachment for contempt offered to the lower court:
1'1ining Co. v. Fremont, 7 Cal. 130. In such cases there is a
right of appeal in New York and Wisconsin: Sudlow v. Knox,
7 Abb. Pr. N. S. 411; Shannon v. State, 18 Wis. 604.
(One court will not punish contempt to another.)

As a corollary to the rule that courts are exclusive judges of
their own contempts (Exparte Chamberlain,4 Cowen 49), it follows that no court will punish or take cognisance of contempt to
another: Johnston v. Commonwealth, 1 Bibb 598.
In .x parte Tillinghast, 4 Pet. 108, the Supreme Court of the
United States, IARSHALL, 0. J., refused to consider as an objection to the admission of a counsellor to its bar that he had been
stricken off the rolls of the United States District Court, saying:
"This court does not consider itself authorized to punish here for
contempts which may have been committed in that court."
In England, the King's Bench would not issue an attachment
for a contempt to an inferior jurisdiction as that of a justice of the
peace: Rex v. Burchett, Str. 567.
Nor will the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania punish contempt
to the process of another court, such as the Common Pleas of a
county: Penn v. Messinger, 1 Yeates 2.
IV.

STATUTORY CHANGES AND LIMITATIONS OF THE COMMON

LAW AS TO CONTEMPT.

A full discussion and statement of the modifications of the comlaw as to contempt of court made by the several states would
occupy too much space here. It would, moreover, be of little use,
such modifications in any state being comparatively unimportant
in the others.
Some observations on this general tendency may not be out of
place.
As a rule, the design and effect of such alterations has been to
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narrow the definition of the offence, diminish the classes of persons to whom it can be imputed, and restrict the power over it of
the courts, especially by limiting their power to fine and imprison.
Very noticeably is this the case as regards constructive contempts by publication, &c., (which have been abrogated as regards
the federal courts: United States v. Holmes, Wall. Jr. 1; Rev.
Stat. U. S. 137, sect. 725), in Pennsylvania, where, till the Act
3d April 1809, the common law regulated the power of the courts
(Hummel 4"Bishoff's Oase, 9 Watts 431), and in Mississippi and
several other states where contempts not in facie curiw, by persons
other than officers of the court, jurors, parties and persons served
with process do not exist: Bishop Cr. Law, sect. 257; .Ex parte
Hickey; 4 Sm. & M. 751. The change has done -away with a
power which might infringe the liberty of the citizen: PORTER, J.,
of 0. P. in Hummel J' Bishoff's Case, supra, 423.
As an illustration of this tendency may be mentioned two very
interesting cases which occurred shortly after the Revolution, in
Pennsylvania, and just after the adoption by that state of the Constitution of the United States. These were tes. v. Oswald, 1 Dall.
329, and lies. v. Passmore, 3 Yeates 441.
In the first, the contempt was a publication in the newspaper of
the offender relative to a case pending in court, calculated to prejudice the public and excite doubts as to the integrity and impartiality of the judges. The offender refused to answer interrogatories
and was fined and imprisoned for a month, and till payment of the
fine and costs. He memorialized the General Assembly, where
the matter was much discussed, and an unsuccessful effort made to
impeach the judges. The second case was similar and resulted in
impeachment of the judges, who were acquitted, and in the passage
of the Act of 1809.
In the United States the power of the courts in this respect has
been looked on with jealousy, and a very strong disposition shown
to restrict it, as in the instances just cited.
It has been declared to be "arbitrary" in its nature (Batchelder
v. Moore, 42 Cal. 412), to be an exception to the provisions of the
Constitution of the United States, and not to be extended in the
least degree beyond the limits imposed by statute. Butherford v.
Holmes, 6 Hun. (N. Y.) 317 ; Bergh's Case, 16 Abb. Pr. (N. S.)
266; People v. Jacobs, 66 N. Y. 8.
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A commitment "1till the further order of the court" has been
said not to "consort with our free institutions :" .Ex parte Alexander, 2 Am. Law Reg. 57.
The result of the tendency which has prevailed in this country
to limit the power of the courts over this offence is strikingly exemplified in a case of recent occurrence in Pennsylvania (Commonwealth v. Curtis, 37 Leg. Int. 83). A habeas corpus had
been issued for the body of an infant, and duly served on one of
the parties having custody of it; the other avoided service by
absconding with the infant, being aided and warned by the party
who had been served; the child was taken out of the state, and
the process of the court rendered nugatory. The offence had
not "one mitigating feature to break the force of the law's condemnation ;" legal process had been treated with "utter contempt,"
yet the court could only fine the offender, the party served, who,
in default of payment thereof, could only be imprisoned for three
months.
In some states, the common law as to contempt of court has been
but little changed; such is the case in Illinois, where the constitution
of the state regulates the common law: Storey v. -People, 79 Ill.
45 (1875); Connecticut, where, however, the power of the courts
to fine and imprison is limited: Middlebrook v. State, 43 Conn.
257; Tyler v. Hamersley, 44 Id. 393; it is also provided by statute that grand jurors shall have in this respect the powers of a
justice of the peace; Maine, see Rev. Stat. 1871; New Hampshire, in which it is provided by statute that contempt, by an attorney shall be summarily inquired into, and that the Supreme
Court, or a justice thereof, may revise proceedings for contempt
where a person is imprisoned or restrained by any other authority
than the Supreme Court (Revision of 1867).
In Rhode Island, there is no statutory law of contempt (Gen.
Stat. 1872) ; and in Vermont the only provisions are those giving
a writ of habeas corpus in the Supreme Court to persons imprisoned
therefor, regulating the proceedings thereon, and specifying certain
causes of discharge (Gen. Stat. 1870).
In Kentucky (Gen. Stat. 1873), no court can fine beyond thirty
dollars, or imprison for more than three hours without sending the
offender before a jury, where the truth of the matter may be given
in evidence; the jury can fine and imprison at discretion.
In the Code of Virginia (1873), and of West Virginia (1868),
Vor. XXIX.- 55
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the same peculiarity is found, the power of the court to punisa
without the intervention of a jury being limited; but the court can
call a jury to determine the proper amount of punishment. It is
also provided by the Code of Virginia that the governor may remit
the punishment for contempt.
By the Code of Tennessee, the power of the courts over conteMpt is statutory only, their common law powers being entirely
abrogated (Statutes 1871).
In Massachusetts, a limited power to fine and imprison is conferred by statutes on courts-martial (Rev. 1859); in New Hampshire on notaries public (Rev. 1867); in South Carolina, on county"
commissioners acting as such (Rev. Stat. 1873); and in Missouri,
arbitrators of causes have, in this respect, the power of justices of

the peace (Rev. Stat. 1845).
The New York statutes provide, among other things, that in case
of injury to any one, the fine for contempt shall be made of such
amount as will indemnify him (Fay's Dig. 1874).
And in Oregon, in the like case, the court may adjudge in addition to the punishment for contempt, a sum sufficient to indemnify

the injured party (Gen. Laws of Oregon 1843-1872).
CHARLES CHAUNCEY.'
Philadelphia.
D. J.,
FLAITAoND,
Unitea
of
case
the
Tennessee,
in the United States Circuit Court, Western District,
States ex rel. Southern Express Co. v. Memphis 4- Little Rock Railroad Co. et al., 6
Fed. Rep. 237.
This was a contempt of court by breach of an injunction by a foreign corporation, acting through its agents within the jurisdiction of the court. The violation
was deliberate and intentional on the part of the superior officers of the corporation
who were out of the jurisdiction of the court, and issued their orders to their subordinates within it.
The necessity of obedience to their superiors would have mitigated the offence of
these subordinates had not the evidence disclosed a too great readiness on their part
to obey the order of their superiors and disregard that of the court; certain of them
were, therefore, fined, and committed till payment of fine and costs. This was authorized by the Acts of Congress, which have prescribed the punishment of fine or
imprisonment for contempt of court.
The corporation also was fined, on the ground that a corporation, where amenable
to the criminal law, may be so punished (citing Bish. Cr. Law, 6th ed. sect. 424).
As a corporation, though it has no soul, nor indeed, a body, has a pocket, it would
seem to be in accordance with reason and justice that it should be fined, whenever
guity of any offence so punishable. No difficulty stands in the way of enforcing
this penalty, such as exists in carrying out that of imprisonment. A corporation
I Since the above was written, there has been decided by Judge
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may be guilty of a tort, is liable for damages for neglect of duty, and may be sued
in trover, and in trespass for the act of its agent when "directed, s/'ered or ratifiedl
by the corporation:" Angell & Ames on Corp., sects. 384, 385, 386-9. For a nonfeasance it is indictable without doubt, and even for certain wrongful acts, it has
been held that an indictmcnt may be maintained : Id. sects. 395-6. See also U. S.
2
Dig., Corp. V., pl. 1311-13 6 ; 1 Bish. Cr. Law, sect. 420. It would seem to be a
logical sequence of these principles, that, as is said in 2 High on Injunction (6th
ed.) sect. 1460 : "A court of equity has jurisdiction to punish a corporation as
As authority for
well as a private person for contempt in violating an injunction."
where for vio(1876),
622
Y.
N.
64
Co.,
F.
I.
S.
Y.
6v.
N.
Mayor
cited
this are
lation of an injunction by its president, a corporation was fined, and the president
fined and imprisoned; and Stokes v. Banbury Board of iealth, Law Rep., 1 Eq. 42,
where, in a like case, sequestration was granted against the property of the corporation. And also People v. A. J- V . Railroad Co., 12 Abb. Pr. 171.
Two very interesting cases, involving conflict of jurisdiction between federal and
state courts, have recently occurred in Missouri, reports of which have been forwarded by T. K. Skinker, Esq., Reporter of the Supreme Court of Missouri.
In the case of United States ex. rel. Knapp v. The Judges of the County Court of
Scotland county, Mo., United States Circuit Court, Eastern District Mo., May 21st
1881, a peremptory writ of mandamus had been issued and served on the respondents,
requiring them to levy a tax in their county to pay a judgment obtained by the
relator on certain railroad bonds of the county. Summoned to show cause why they
should not be punished for contempt in disobeying said writ, they answered that,
on service on them of said writ they had at once, under a state statute (Rev. Stat.
Mo. 1879, sects. 6798-6806), caused the county attorney to present a petition to
the judge of tile Circuit Court of Scotland county, for leave to levy said tax. The
Supreme Court of the state having previously decided that the subscription under
which plaintiff's bonds were issued was void, tie Circuit Court judge, feeling himself bound by said decision, had declined to grant leave to make said levy. That
said statute prohibited respondents from making such levy without leave as stated,
under penalty of fine and vacation of their offices. This statute, which had been
passed long after the issue of the bonds in question, had been held by the federal
courts of this circuit to be inoperative as against such bond. See United States v.
Li'ncola County, 5 Dillon C. C. 184.
TREAT, I). J., accordingly held this answer insufficient, and, respondents declining to answer further, sentenced them to imprisonment for three months, or until
such time within the three months as they might sign and file a paper expressing a
willingness to make the levy.
The same order was made in a second case against the same respondents.
In the case of Hoff Y. Tihe Collector of Jasper County, United States Circuit Court,
Western Division, Western District, Mo., May 19th 1881, before MtULLER and
KREKEL, JJ., the County Court of Jasper County, in obedience to a peremptory
writ of mandamus from the United States Circuit Court, had caused a tax to be
levied in Marion township to pay a judgment on railroad bonds of the county
obtained by Hoff. The Circuit Court of the county had enjoined the collector from
enforcing collections ; thereafter an alias peremptory writ had been issued and served
on the collector requiring him to proceed with the collections. Three months after
service of the writ his term of office had expired, and his successor had been
installed, but meanwhile he had made no effort to obey the writ, but had rather
dissuaded such persons as were willing to pay their taxes.

